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ResearchNovember 11, 2026

Yield Stablecoin Failures 2025–2026: What Failed in Each Case

A dated timeline of seven yield-product failures from 2025 to 2026: what happened, the mechanism, and who could move the money in each case.

Yield Stablecoin Failures 2025–2026: What Failed in Each Case

Seven yield products paused, lost their peg, closed or went offline between September 2025 and August 2026. The causes differ, but one fact repeats. In each case a small group could move or lend the assets, or one key could mint tokens, and holders learned about the problem after the event.

Data as at 16 November 2026. Rates and sizes change daily; each figure links to its source.

Each entry has the same four lines. Read "Who could move the money" first.

September 2025: Hypervault

  • Date: 26 September 2025.
  • What happened: a security firm flagged an abnormal withdrawal of about $3.6 million from Hypervault, a yield platform on Hyperliquid. The funds went to Ethereum, and 752 ETH went into Tornado Cash. The website and social accounts went offline (The Block, Decrypt).
  • Mechanism: a suspected exit by the party that controlled the vaults. No team was publicly identified.
  • Who could move the money: the suspected operators, who held the keys.

November 2025: Stream Finance (xUSD)

  • Date: 4 November 2025.
  • What happened: Stream said that an external fund manager had disclosed a loss of about $93 million in Stream fund assets. Stream paused deposits and withdrawals. xUSD fell about 77% (CoinMarketCap).
  • Mechanism: depositor assets were with a manager outside the protocol. A lawsuit filed in December 2025 in a US federal court in California, Stream Trading Corp. v. McMeans, alleges that Stream assets were used to cover a trader's personal losses. The claim is unproven and the defendant denies it.
  • Who could move the money: the external fund manager.

November 2025: Elixir (deUSD)

  • Date: 6 November 2025.
  • What happened: Elixir said that Stream held about 90% of the deUSD supply, and that a similar share of the remaining deUSD backing was a loan to Stream. Elixir turned off minting and redemption, took a snapshot and opened USDC claims for the other holders. It said it had processed redemptions for 80% of holders, not counting Stream.
  • Mechanism: concentration. Most of the backing was a loan to one borrower, and Elixir said that borrower had decided not to repay.
  • Who could move the money: the issuer, which lent the backing, and then the borrower.

March 2026: Resolv (USR)

  • Date: 22 March 2026.
  • What happened: Resolv said an exploit let attackers mint unbacked USR, and it paused the protocol. Halborn puts the total at about 80 million USR in two mints and the loss at about $23 million. USR fell to $0.0025 on Curve at its low.
  • Mechanism: one private key signed mint approvals. It was in a cloud key-management service and it was compromised. The contract did not compare the deposit with the amount minted.
  • Who could move the money: the holder of one signing key.

June 2026: Main Street (msUSD)

  • Date: 20 June 2026.
  • What happened: the reserve-verification provider for msUSD ended its agreement and said Main Street could not meet its verification standards. msUSD fell as much as 85% within a day, to a low near $0.06 (crypto.news, Protos). Main Street said it "remains fully backed" and called this a reporting issue.
  • Mechanism: holders depended on one third-party view of reserves that were mainly options positions (box spreads). When that view stopped, holders could not check the backing.
  • Who could move the money: the issuer.

June 2026: Altura

  • Date: 21 June 2026.
  • What happened: after more than 8.5 million USDT of instant redemptions in 24 hours, Altura started an orderly wind-down of its vault. It said it had no exposure to Main Street. In late July it said a bank had temporarily restricted an account that held more than £16.4 million for the final payments (Cryptopolitan).
  • Mechanism: a liquidity mismatch, not an exploit. Instant redemptions were offered against positions on exchanges, in private credit and in real-world assets.
  • Who could move the money: the operator and its off-chain counterparties.

August 2026: Neutrl (NUSD)

Neutrl has no relation to Neutral Trade. This page explains the difference.

  • Date: 13 August 2026.
  • What happened: Neutrl paused minting and redemptions "following circumstances affecting protocol reserves". On 17 September it opened redemptions at a fixed rate. The redemption contract on Ethereum returns a rate of 0.51. Neutrl has not published a loss figure.
  • Mechanism: not disclosed in full. Neutrl's documentation says reserves included hedged OTC token positions, and reports say Neutrl disclosed that part of them was not liquid.
  • Who could move the money: the operator.

The Pattern Across the Seven Cases

  • Few hands: in six cases the operator, a manager or a borrower controlled the assets. In the seventh, one key controlled minting.
  • Late information: holders saw a pause or a price fall first. The cause came later, or has not come.
  • A peg hides the loss: a token that trades at $1 shows no loss until the day it shows all of it.
  • Exit terms did not hold: instant redemption was there until many holders used it together.

The Questions for Any Product, Including Neutral Trade

Before you deposit, you can check five things: who can move the assets, to which addresses, how many keys are necessary, where you can see the positions, and what happens when many holders redeem together. Seven questions to ask before you hold a yield-bearing stablecoin gives the full list.

The answers for a Neutral Strategy Vault:

  • Source of yield: a trading strategy run by an independent trading firm.
  • Who holds the assets: the vault program, MPC wallets and off-exchange custodians.
  • Who can move them: trading firms receive trading authority only and cannot withdraw your deposit; withdrawals can only go to the wallet that deposited.
  • Exit time: the vault's next redemption day, once or twice a week. It is not instant.
  • Main risk: trading loss, exchange risk, custodian risk, smart-contract risk and operational risk. The value of positions on external venues is reported on-chain by a permissioned keeper, so you rely on that report.

Can a vault manager withdraw my funds? explains the structure and its limits.

Frequently asked questions

What happened to xUSD?

Stream Finance paused deposits and withdrawals on 4 November 2025, after an external fund manager disclosed a loss of about $93 million. xUSD then fell about 77%. A lawsuit from December 2025 makes allegations about the cause, and they are unproven.

Why did deUSD collapse?

Elixir said most of the deUSD backing was a loan to Stream, and Stream held about 90% of the supply. When Stream paused, Elixir closed deUSD and opened USDC claims for the other holders.

Was the Resolv USR incident a smart-contract bug?

The attacker used a compromised signing key to approve mints. The contract accepted the approval without a check of the deposit value.

Did Altura lose depositor funds?

Altura reported no exploit and called its closure an orderly wind-down. The public record shows that the final payments were delayed by a restricted bank account. We found no statement that the wind-down is complete.

Does a vault share prevent these problems?

No. A vault share shows losses in its net asset value when they are reported, and it has no peg. It does not remove trading loss or venue failure.


All strategies carry risk. The withdrawal rule in Neutral Strategy Vaults removes one risk on this list: that the firm withdraws the money. Trading loss, exchange risk, custodian risk, smart-contract risk and operational risk stay. You can lose money.

Neutral Trade wrote this post and offers products that compete with some of the products named here. Check every claim against the linked sources.

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